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the Supreme Court. The conclusive presumption of use of inside
information under section 16(b) should not be extended to cover an
initial purchase of a ten percent interest, since at the time of that
purchase, the individual did not enjoy the relationship with the
issuer which, under the statute's terms, would facilitate access to
such information. Finally, it is suggested that the courts should leave
any expansion of section 16(b) coverage to Congress and that the
role of the courts should be confined to effectuating the plain lan-
guage of the statute in its present form.
JOSEPH PIZZURRO
Civil Procedure—Diversity Actions—Conflict Between Federal
Rule and State Law with Direct Substantive Effect—Marshall v.
Muirenin. 1 —Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Marshall, brought suit for
personal injuries in the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts on grounds of diversity. Named as defendants in
the suit were Mr. and Mrs. Kirk, who at the time of the accident
were the record owners of the property on which the injury oc-
curred. Shortly after the applicable Massachusetts statute of limita-
tions had expired, 2 plaintiffs learned that Mr. and Mrs. Mulrenin,
rather than the Kirks, had actually been the owners of the property
at the time of accident. Upon learning this fact, plaintiffs moved to
amend their complaint by replacing the Kirks with the Mulrenins as
the named defendants. However, since the Mulrenins had not been
notified of the suit until after the statute had run, the district court
held that the amendment was impermissible. 3 The grounds for the
court's holding were that the requirements set forth in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(c) 4
 for the relation back of amendments had
' 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974).
2
 In diversity actions, since federal courts must apply state substantive law, the same
statute of limitations must be applied that would be applied if the case were being tried in
state court because a statute of limitations has a direct substantive effect. Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
3
 508 F.2d at 40-41. According to the certificate on file in the appropriate town hall, Mr.
and Mrs. Kirk were the owners of the business premises upon which the plaintiff-wife fell. In
fact, however, the Kirks had sold the premises to Mr. and Mrs. Mulrenin several years before
the accident occurred but had neglected to file, in violation of Massachusetts law, a notice of
discontinuance. Mass, Gen. Laws ch. 110, § 5 (Supp. 1975). When plaintiffs instituted their
suit, one month before the statute of limitations was due to expire, they relied upon the
certificate in naming the Kirks as defendants. Not until after the statute had run did the
plaintiffs learn that the Mulrenins had actually been the owners at the time of the accident.
508 F.2d at 41.
4
 Fed. R. Civ, P. 15(c) provides in pertinent part:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if
. . within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the
party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution
of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits,
and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity
of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. . . .
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not been met. 5
 According to the court, 6 it was bound to apply Rule
15(c), rather than the Massachusetts statute on relation back of
amendments (section 50, 1 because of the Supreme Court's decision
in Hanna v. Plumer. 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re-
versed the district court's decision and HELD: State procedural
laws which have a direct substantive effect prevail over Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure when the two appear to be in conflict. 9
Thus, the court held that since section 51 has a direct substantive
effect, it, rather than Rule 15(c), is controlling on the issue of the
permissibility of the amendment.'° In reaching this decision, the
court of appeals rejected the district court's conclusion that Hanna
required the Federal Rule to be applied. The court of appeals
interpreted Hanna as stating that in a diversity action, when a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure conflicts on its face with a state
law, the Federal Rule prevails, except when the state law, "although
cast in procedural terms, has a direct substantive effect."" The
Federal Rule should "not . . . be applied to the extent, if any, that it
would defeat rights arising from state substantive law as distin-
guished from state procedure."' 2
 Section 51 has a "direct substan-
tive effect," 13
 according to the court of appeals, because that section
determines when an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling
the statute of limitations when the wrong defendant has been named
in the original complaint.' 4
 The court reasoned that section 51 is
an integral part of the statute of limitations, and therefore, a sub-
stantive law for purposes of diversity suits. is It was on the basis of
this conclusion—that section 51 has a direct substantive effect—that
the court in Marshall decided that the state law, rather than Rule
15(c), should prevail.
In the first of a series of cases in which the Supreme Court has
attempted to establish guidelines for the use of the federal courts in
5 508 F.2d at 4041.
° Id. at 41.
7
 At the time in question Mass, Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 51 (Tercentenary ed. 1932)
provided in part:
The court may, at any time before final judgment . . allow amendments introduc-
ing a necessary party Ion discontinuing as to a party ... and may allow any other
amendment in matter of form or substance in any'process, pleading or proceeding,
which may enable the plaintiff to sustain the action for the cause for which it was
intended to be brought ... .
Rev. Laws of 1902, ch. 173, § 48. With some exceptions not relevant here, § 51 had been
replaced by Mass. R. Civ. P. 15(c), which retains its content, though not its exact language.
I 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See text at notes 35-42 infra.
9 508 F.2d at 44.
1 ° Id. at 44-45.
11
 Id. at 44.
12 Id.
13 Id .
14 Id.
15
 Id. See note 2 supra.
853
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
diversity actions in determining which law should prevail in federal
law-state law conflicts, the Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 1 b held
that the substantive law to be applied in diversity actions is state
law, except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
acts of Congress." The holding was based on the Court's reinterpre-
tation of section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act." Under the origi-
nal interpretation, federal courts were bound to apply state statutory
law but not state common law in diversity actions." Consequently,
the federal courts had exercised independent judgment as to what
the substantive state law was, or should have been, when a state
statute did not cover the particular issue before the federal courts. 2 °
The Court found that the original construction of section 34 was
unconstitutional on the grounds that it permitted federal courts to
infringe on the exclusive right of the states to determine state law. 21
The fact that, under the original construction, federal courts were not
bound to apply the same common law as the state courts, led to
forum shopping between the state and federal courts located within
the same state. 22
 Furthermore, this led to discrimination between
noncitizens and citizens of a particular state, since common law
rights varied according to whether enforcement was sought in state
or federal court, and the privilege of selecting the court in which to
seek enforcement was conferred on the noncitizen. 23 Accordingly,
the Court in Erie also criticized the original construction of section
34 because of the forum shopping and inequitable administration of
the law caused by this construction.
Erie was followed by Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 24 in which
the Court held that the determination of whether a federal court in a
diversity action was bound to apply a particular state law should
not hinge on traditional characterizations of the state law as sub-
stantive or procedural but on the result of the outcome-
determination test. 25
 According to the outcome-determination test, a
federal court is bound to apply a state law when the outcome of a
suit would be significantly different depending on whether state or
federal law is applied. 26 In Guaranty Trust the court also reaffirmed
its position against forum shopping, inequitable administration of
16
 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
11
 Id. at 78.
'" Federal Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 34, 1 Stat. 92.
19
 E.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). Leading cases which adhered to the
Court's original interpretation of section 34 are collected in Black & Wliite Taxicab Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1928).
2° E.g., Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928) (obligations under contracts entered into and to be performed within a state); Lake
Shore & M.S. Ry. v, Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893) (right to punitive damages).
21 304 U.S. at 79-80.
22 Id. at 73-74.
23 Id. at 74-75.
24
 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
25 Id. at 110.
26
 Id. at 109.
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the law, and encroachment of the states' constitutional rights by the
federal courts. 27
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc., 28 the Court
held that the result of the outcome-determination test should not be
the sole criterion for determining whether a federal court in a
diversity action is bound to apply a state law. 29 State and federal
policies behind the conflicting laws must also be considered. 3 ° In
this case the federal law involved was grounded on a constitutional
amendment, 3 ' while the state law involved was merely grounded on
custom and convenience. 32 Therefore, despite the possibility that
application of the federal law might have led to a significantly
different outcome than if the state law had been applied, 33 the
Court ruled that the federal law prevailed because of the importance
of the policy behind it. 34
In Hanna, the issue was whether in a diversity action service of
process should be made in the manner prescribed by Massachusetts
law (section 9) 35 or in the manner set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(1). 36 The plaintiff had served the defendant by leav-
ing copies of the summons and complaint with the defendant's wife
at his residence, in compliance with the Federal Rule, but not with
section 9. 37 In resolving the issue the Supreme Court differentiated
between the procedures to be used to resolve federal law-state law
conflicts involving a federal common law and those involving a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The Court explained that to re-
solve conflicts involving a federal common law the outcome-
determination test is to be used in conjunction with a consideration
of the "twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shop-
ping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the la.ws."38
When the conflict involves a Federal Rule, however, the Federal
Rule is to prevail if it is valid. 39 A Federal Rule is valid if it is
within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act" and constitutional
restrictions.'" The Court held that since Federal Rule 4(d)(1) is
27 Id. at 110-112.
" 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
29 Id. at 537.
30 Id. at 538.
31 In Byrd, the issue was whether certain questions of fact should be determined by a
judge or a jury. State law, requiring determination by a judge, was in conflict with the right
to a jury trial protected in federal courts by the Seventh Amendment.
32 356 U.S. at 536, 539.
33 Id. at 537.
34 Id. at 538.
" Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 197 § 9 (1958).
36 380 U.S. at 461.
37 Id. at 461-62.
38 Id. at 468.
39 Id. at 471.
48 28 U.S.C.	 2072 (1970).
41 Neither Congress nor the federal courts can devise rules which are not supported by a
grant of federal authority contained in Article I (The Congress), Article III (The Judiciary), or
855
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valid, it is the standard against which the district court should have
measured the adequacy of service. 42
The Rules Enabling Act laid the foundation for the promulga-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Act states that the
Supreme Court has the power to prescribe procedural rules to be
used in the federal district courts as long as the rules do not
"abridge, enlarge or modify" substantive rights. 43 Since the Court's
decision in Hanna, a debate has arisen concerning the kinds of
Federal Rule-state law conflicts to which the holding applies. Some
courts and commentators claim that the Supreme Court intends its
holding to be applied to all Federal Rule-state law conflicts in
diversity actions." Others claim that the Supreme Court intends its
holding to be limited to conflicts in which the state law involved
does not have a direct substantive effect. 45
The First Circuit considered its decision in Marshall to be in
harmony with Hanna. 46
 It viewed section 9 as having a direct
substantive effect47 and reasoned that the Supreme Court in Hanna
had mistakenly viewed section 9 as being solely procedural in ef-
fect." Furthermore, the court in Marshall concluded that the Su-
preme Court had intended the holding in Hanna, that valid Federal
Rules prevail over conflicting state laws, to be applied only to
situations like the one which the Court had before it. 49 That is, the
court construed the holding in Hanna to mean that in those diversity
suits in which the conflict is between a Federal Rule and a "strictly
procedural"5° state law, the controlling factor should be the validity
of the Federal Rule. Validity does not become the controlling factor,
however, until it is first determined that the state law is "strictly
procedural."
some other section of the Constitution. Powers not delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment. 380 U.S. at 470-72.
42 Id. at 463-64.
43
 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
" E.g., Welch v. Louisiana,Power & Light Co., 446 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir. 1972);
McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 Va. L. Rev. 884, 887
(1965). See notes 82, 97-99 infra and accompanying text.
45 E.g., Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 950-54 (8th Cir. 1973);
Siegel, The Federal Rules in Diversity Cases: Erie Implemented, Not Retarded, 54 A.B.A.J.
172, 176 (1968). See notes 85-96, 100 infra and accompanying text.
46. 508 F.2d at 44-45. The First Circuit was the court of appeals which had decided
Hanna and whose decision was subsequently overturned by a unanimous Supreme Court.
Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
47 508 F.2d at 42-43. Section 9 (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 197, § 9 (1958)) is the state law
which was in conflict with Federal Rule 4(dX1) in Hanna. See notes 35-37 infra and accom-
panying text. •
48
 Id. at 41-42. Professor Chayes also thinks that the Hanna Court was incorrect in
viewing section 9 to be solely procedural in effect. Chayes, Some Further Last Words on
Erie—The Bead Game, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 752 (1974).
49
 508 F.2d at 43.
5° Id. at 44.
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The court's conclusion in Marshall, that the Supreme Court in
Hanna viewed section 9 as being "strictly procedural," was based on
two statements made by the Supreme Court in Hanna. One was the
Supreme Court's rejection of the defendant's contention that section
9 "embrace[d] substantive goals." 51
 The other was the statement
that only the part of section 9 that dealt with the manner in which
service should be made was involved in the conflict before it. 52 The
fact that the holding in Hanna was "contained in [a] disclaimer of an
intent to effect substantive consequences,"" led the court in Mar-
shall to its other conclusion, that the holding in Hanna must be
limited to conflicts between two "strictly procedural" rules. This
conclusion was also based on the court's finding that "[n]othing in
the language of the [Hanna] opinion suggests" that the Federal
Rules are to be given "so broad a scope that every state statute
which . . . could be thought to conflict therewith could not survive,
regardless of its substance." 54
It is not clear whether the First Circuit in Marshall has cor-
rectly interpreted Hanna because the Supreme Court did not ex-
pressly indicate whether it considered the conflict before it to be
between two strictly procedural rules. It is submitted, however, that
Hanna can correctly be construed as supporting the First Circuit's
decision. On its face, the holding in Hanna, that if a Federal Rule is
valid, the Federal Rule, rather than a conflicting state rule, is
controlling," appears to provide support for the position, contrary
to the one taken in Marshall, that the validity of a Federal Rule
should be the sole consideration in Federal Rule-state law conflicts.
However, when this holding is considered in conjunction with other
statements in Hanna, which indicate that the Supreme Court
viewed section 9 as being a purely procedural regulation," it can be
reasonably argued that the Supreme Court intended the validity of
51
 Id. at 43-44, citing 380 U.S. at 462-63, 465.
52 508 F.2d at 42 & n.3, citing 380 U.S. at 462-63 n.1. The Supreme Court had
previously noted that section 9 consisted of two parts, a manner of service provision and a
statute of limitations. 380 U.S. at 462-63 n.1.
53 508 F.2d at 44. The "disclaimer" to which the Marshall court was referring was the
Supreme Court's statement in Hanna that "[p]etitioner, in choosing her forum, was not
presented with a situation where application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery;
rather, ... [it] would have resulted only in altering the way in which process was served." Id.
at 44 n.8, quoting 380 U.S. at 469.
54 508 F.2d at 43.
55 380 U.S. at 463-64'.
56 The following statements from Hanna indicate that the Supreme Court viewed the
part of § 9 before it to be merely procedural: (I) "Section 9 is in part a statute of limitations
. . . This part of the statute . . . is not involved in this case. . . . Section 9 also provides for
the manner of service. . . [T]his part of the statute . . . is involved here." Id. at 462-63, n.1;
(2) "[A]dherence to the state rule [in this case] would have resulted only in altering the way in
which process was served." Id. at 469 (emphasis added); (3) "To hold that a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created
rights would be to disembowel the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or
Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act." Id. at 473-74 (emphasis
added).
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the Federal Rule to be the controlling factor only when the conflict-
ing state law did not have a substantive effect. Furthermore, it is
significant that in Hanna the Supreme Court distinguished, rather
than overruled, its prior cases involving Federal Rule-state law
conflicts in which it had held that the state law prevailed." The
Court explained that these cases were distinguishable from Hanna
because in these cases it had been determined that the Federal Rule
did not cover "the point in dispute." 58 The fact that these cases were
distinguished provides support for the First Circuit's interpretation
of Hanna for the following reason. In two of these cases the Federal
Rule was found to not cover "the point in dispute" because the state
law had a substantive effect. 59 These two cases were Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer Co. 6° and Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. 61
In Ragan, the plaintiff contended that his action was timely
because he had filed his complaint, and thereby commenced the
action according to Federal Rule 3, before the statute of limitation's
had run. 62
 The defendant noted, however, that according to state
law an action was not commenced until the defendant was served
with process. Therefore, he claimed that since he had not been
served until after the statute had run, the suit was time-barred. 63
The Supreme Court held that the issue of whether the suit had been
commenced before the statute of limitations had expired was to be
determined by state law, not Federal Rule 3. 64 The Court based its
holding in part on the outcome-determination test 65 and in part on
the basis that the court of appeals had found the state law to be an
integral part of the statute of limitations, 66 a substantive law for
'Sr Id. at 470. The cases distinguished were: Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949), Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), and Palmer v. Hoffman,
318 U.S. 109 (1943). In Palmer the Court found that Federal Rule and state law were not in
conflict because the Federal Rule dealt with pleading contributory negligence, while the state
law dealt with proving it. Id. at 116-18. This case does not support the decision in Marshall
since, unlike Marshall, the Federal Rule did not appear on its face to conflict with the state
law.
56 '380 U.S. at 470.
59 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 555-56; Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533-34.
" 337 U.S. 530 (1949). While many courts have continued to apply Ragan, see cases
cited in C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 59, at 246 n.40 (2d ed. 1970), other courts
interpret Hanna as having overruled Ragan. See cases cited in id. n.38. Professor Wright
concludes that the former line of cases represents the correct interpretation of Hanna:
The majority opinion in Hanna was at pains, at two separate places, to distinguish
Ragan from Hanna. . . . [W]hen the Court has not overruled Ragan, and has gone
to great lengths to indicate why Hanna is not inconsistent with Ragan, it seems the
safer course to assume that the Ragan decision is still authoritative.
Id. at 246 (footnotes omitted).
" 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
62 337 U.S. at 531.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 532-34.
65 Id. at 532.66
	
at 534.
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purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 67 In regard to this finding, the
Supreme Court stated: "We cannot give it [the right which the
federal court was asked to enforce] longer life in the federal court
than it would have had in the state court without adding something
to the cause of action. We may not do that consistently with Erie
. . "68 In Ragan, then, the fact that the state law in conflict with
Federal Rule 3 was integrally-related to the statute of limitations
was a major reason for the Court's decision that the state law
prevailed. The fact that the substantive effect of the state law
involved in Ragan influenced the Court to hold that the state law,
rather than the conflicting Federal Rule, prevailed, supports the
contention of the First Circuit in Marshall, that the Court intended
its holding in Hanna to be applied only to conflicts in which the
state law does not have a direct substantive effect.
Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp." was the other case distin-
guished by the Court in Hanna" in which the fact that the state law
had a substantive effect influenced . the Court's decision. The issue
was whether the district court in a diversity action was bound to
apply the state law concerning the procedure for bringing stockhold-
ers' derivative suits:71 According to this law, the plaintiff, if unsuc-
cessful, was liable for the defendant'g expenses, and the corporate
defendant was entitled to require security for this payment before
the case could be tried on its merits. 72 The plaintiff urged that
Federal Rule 23, which at that time also covered the procedure for
bringing derivative suits but which did not contain these particular
provisions, should govern. 73 Justice Douglas would have found for
the plaintiff because he thought that the state law merely regulated
procedure, and therefore, that the Federal Rule should be applied. 74
The majority held, however, that the state law must be followed,
since it had a substantive, as well as a procedural, effect. 75 The
Court explained that the state law was procedural in the sense that
67 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
"I 337 U.S. at 533-34. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court held that
federal courts in diversity actions must apply state substantive law, Id. at 78-79,
69 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
" 380 U.S. at 470 & n.12.
7 ' 337 U.S. at 543.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 556.
74 Id. at 557 (dissenting opinion).
75 Id. at 555-57. The Court stated:
Even if we were to agree that the [state] statute is procedural, it would not
determine that it is not applicable. Rules which lawyers call procedural do not
always exhaust their effect by regulating procedure. But this statute is not merely a
regulation of procedure. , . [lit creates a new liability . . . [in addition to
prescribing] a procedure ... by which the liability is insured . . .. We do not think a
statute which so conditions the stockholder's action can be disregarded by the federal
court as a mere procedural device.
Id. at 555-56.
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it prescribed a method by which the defendant-corporation could be
indemnified for the cost of its defense, if the judgment was in its
favor. 76
 However, the Court stated that the law was also substan-
tive, since it subjected the plaintiff-shareholder to a liability that he
had not been subjected to at common law. 77 Since the holding of the
First Circuit in Marshall is consistent with the Supreme Court's
decisions in Cohen and Ragan, it is significant that Cohen and Ragan
are both distinguished, rather than overruled, in Hanna. The
treatment of these cases in Hanna supports the interpretation of
Hanna in Marshall.
From some of the language in Hanna, however, it can be
inferred that the Supreme Court would not approve the holding in
Marshall. For example, while describing the constitutional basis and
scope of Congress' power to promulgate Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Hanna Court stated that this power includes the
right "to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain
area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of
classification as either."78 Furthermore, the Court quotes approv-
ingly in Hanna a statement by the Fifth Circuit that " '[t]he purpose
of the Erie doctrine ... was never to bottle up federal courts with
'outcome-determinative' and 'integral-relations' stoppers—when
there are 'affirmative countervailing [federal] considerations' and
when there is a Congressional mandate (the Rules) supported by
constitutional authority.' "79 It is submitted, however, that such
statements should not be considered to represent the essence of
Hanna. There is language in Hanna which would support the
Marshall interpretation." Moreover, the statement in Hanna, that
only the part of the state law dealing with service of process was at
issue, 81 indicates that the Court did not intend to hold that Federal
Rules prevail over those state laws which, although cast in procedural
terms, have a direct substantive effect.
Justice Harlan, however, would not agree. In his concurring
opinion in Hanna, he stated that "[s]o long as a reasonable man
could characterize any duly adopted federal rule as `procedural;' the
Court, unless I misapprehend what is said, would have it apply no
matter how seriously it frustrated a state's substantive regulation
. . . "82 Therefore, although it has been submitted that the interpre-
tation of Hanna by the First Circuit in Marshall—that Federal
Rules are to prevail only over strictly procedural conflicting state
laws—is reasonable, it is conceded that this is not the only reason-
76
 Id. at 556.
77 Id. at 555-56.
7" 380 U.S. at 472.
79
 Id. at 473, quoting Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th
Cir. 1963).
3° See notes 51-61 infra and accompanying text.
g' 380 U.S. at 462-63 n.l.
82
 Id. at 476 (concurring opinion).
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able interpretation. Hanna is not so clear that only one reasonable
interpretation of the opinion is possible.
In the two Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Hanna in
which Hanna is mentioned, the Court refers to Hanna as a case
dealing with "mere `houskeeping rules' " 83 and "no more than 'pro-
cedural' rules."84 Although neither of these opinions contains an ex-
tensive analysis of Hanna, these two statements do indicate, if any-
thing, support for the Marshall court's position—that valid Federal
Rules prevail over state laws only when the latter are strictly pro-
cedural.
Moreover, Hanna has not received a uniform interpretation
among the United States courts of appeals. The interpretations of
Hanna by the Second and Eighth Circuits are similar to the First
Circuit's interpretation in Marshall, but the Fifth Circuit's interpre-
tation is similar to Justice Harlan's. In Prashar v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 85
 the issue before the Eighth Circuit was whether the
state statute governing commencement of actions or Federal Rule 3,
which also defines when an action is commenced, should be applied
for the purpose of determining if the suit was timely. The court
indicated, after analyzing Hanna," that an important factor in
resolving the issue was whether the state commencement of action
statute was an integral part of the statute of limitations. 87
Since Ragan had been distinguished, rather than overruled in
Hanna, the court in Prashar stated that the standard set out in
Ragan for resolving Federal Rule 3-state law conflicts must not be
ignored." According to that standard, if a state commencement of
an action statute is intimately bound up with the rights and obliga-
tions created by the state statute of limitations, the state law must
govern under the principles of Erie." In regard to how this stan-
dard should be applied, the court stated:
[A] determination must be made in every case as to
whether the state has taken a rule of practice and substan-
tially intertwined that rule with the basic right to recovery.
When this is so, the rule cannot be viewed as affecting only
the mode of relief, and the "countervailing considerations"
of a desired uniform practice in a federal court must yield
to "the policy of uniform enforcement of state-created
rights and obligations. " 90
The court in Prashar determined whether the state statute govern-
ing commencement of actions was an integral part of the statute of
" Chdvron Oil Co, v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 103 n.6 (1971).
84
 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp,, 384 U.S. 63, 67 (1966).
88 480 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1973).
86 Id. at 950-52.
87 Id. at 953.
1/1/ Id. at 950.
" Id. at 951.
9° Id. at 954 n.14.
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limitations by noting, first, that the statute did not refer to the
limitations statute." Secondly, the court noted the holding of the
highest state court that the statute governing commencement of
actions was a general statute, which affected other statutes, as well
as the statute of limitations. 92
 On these grounds the court in Prashar
held that the state commencement of an action statute was not
intimately related to state-created rights and obligations, and there-
fore, that Federal Rule 3 prevailed. 93
Faced with a similar issue in Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey
Co., 94 the Second Circuit also considered the substantive effect of
the state law to be an important factor, on the basis of Hanna, in
determining which law should be applied." The fact that the high-
est state court had defined the state commencement of an action
statute to be a procedural one which did not abridge or enlarge a
cause of action influenced the Second Circuit, as it had the Eighth,
in its decision that the state law did not have a direct substantive
effect, and that therefore the Federal Rule prevailed. 96
In contrast to the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits' interpre-
tation, that Hanna does not require the application of a Federal
Rule when the conflicting state rule has a substantive effect, is the
Fifth Circuit's view that Hanna established a "strong presumption"
that the Federal Rules, rather than state law, should govern in
matters that are "arguably" procedural."
Commentators' interpretations of Hanna, in regard to whether
the Court intended Federal Rules to displace state laws which have
a direct substantive effect, are conflicting themselves. Interpreting
Hanna as requiring that Federal Rules prevail over all conflicting
state laws, one commentator, critical of the Court's decision, has
stated:
91 Id. at 951.
92 Id.
93
 Id. at 954.
94 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).
95
 Id. at 606.
96 Id.
97
 Welch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 446 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir. 1972). The
other circuits have not expressly stated how they interpret Hanna in regard to this issue. In
Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1973), which involved an issue similar to the one
in Marshall, the Seventh Circuit applied Federal Rule 15(c) without giving any reasons for
doing so and without even noting that there was a state law that also covered the matter.
Smith-Hurd Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 46(1) (1968). The Third Circuit, in Loudens Lager v.
Teeple, 466 F.2d 249 (3rd Cir. 1972), held that Rule 15(C) prevailed because otherwise the
Rule's policy of facilitating decisions on the merits would be frustrated. The court cited 3 J.
Moore, Federal Practice § 15.15(2), at 1023 (2d ed. 1968) as authority, while making no
mention of Hanna. 466 F.2d at 250. In Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971), the
Tenth Circuit applied Hanna but stated that it did not have to deal with the problem of
whether Hanna required application of a Federal Rule when a conflicting state law had a
substantive effect, since the state law before it was "purely procedural in nature." Id. at
449-50.
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If the majority opinion in Hanna is taken literally, the
Court has: . . .
(2) ignored, by failing to inquire whether the state rule is
substantive, the Enabling Act restriction that the
federal rules are not to modify substantive rights;
and
(3) found in the Constitution an affirmative grant of
congressional poWer, appropriately delegated to the
Court to make rules of procedure which impair sub-
stantive state law .
	 . . 98
This commentator has in effect taken the position of Justice Harlan,
that, according to the majority in Hanna, if a Federal Rule and a
state law cover the same matter, the Federal Rule prevails, regard-
less of the state law's effect. 99 The interpretations of Hanna by other
commentators, however, resemble that of the First Circuit in Mar-
shall, that Federal Rules only govern when in conflict with purely
procedural state laws.'"
An argument has been advanced by two authors"' that to
apply a Federal Rule rather than a conflicting state law which has a
direct substantive effect would be a violation of the Rules Enabling
Act, 102
 which grants to the Supreme Court the power to prescribe
procedural rules for federal courts. The second provision of the
Rules Enabling Act states that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, en-
large or modify any substantive right." 103
 According to these com-
mentators, whether a Federal Rule "abridge[s], enlarge[s] or modi-
flies] [a] substantive right" can be determined only by analyzing the
conflicting state law to see if it has a substantive effect.'" There-
fore, application of the Federal Rule, rather than the state law, is in
accord with this provision only if no such direct substantive effect is
found.'°5
 The Court in Hanna did not engage in an extensive
analysis of the second provision of the Enabling Act, but it did note
that the "broad command" of the Enabling Act was that "federal
courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural
91
 McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 Va. L. Rev. 884,
887 (1965).
" See text at note 82 supra.
100
 "The Court's observation that Hanna was the first case involving a 'direct collision'
seems to indicate the Court's reluctance to give a broad interpretation to the federal rules if
such an interpretation would result in displacement of a state right which at least is arguably
substantive." Note, 73 W. Va. L. Rev. 289, 297-98 (1971). See Siegel, The Federal Rules in
Diversity Cases: Erie Implemented, Not Retarded, 54 A.B.A.J. 172, 176 (1968).
'°' Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 726-27 (1974); McCoid,
supra note 98, at 901-03.
102
 28 U.S.C. * 2072 (1970).
' 03 Id.
1 °4
 Ely, supra note 101, at 722; McCoid, supra note 98, at 901-02.
1 °0
 Ely, supra note 101, at 726-27; McCoid, supra note 98, at 902.
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law." 1 °6
 This statement could be interpreted as supporting the posi-
tion of these commentators, and of the court in Marshall, that the
,substantive effect of a state law appearing on its face to be pro-
cedural must be a controlling factor in resolving Federal Rule-state
law conflicts.
The approach taken by the First Circuit in Marshall—
determining whether a state law, procedural on its face and in
conflict with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, has a direct sub-
stantive effect, and therefore should prevail over the Federal
Rule—is in harmbny with the interpretation of Hanna by some
commentators'°7 and federal courtsm and with the approach taken
by the Supreme Court prior to Hanna in Ragan 1 ° 9 and Cohen. " 0
However, since the Court in Hanna did not expressly state whether
it considered the state law involved to be strictly procedural, and
since contradictory implications can be drawn from the opinion, it
appears that another Supreme Court decision will be necessary
before a uniform approach among federal courts in resolving Fed-
eral Rule-state law conflicts can be achieved.
Whether the Supreme Court should adopt the method of
analysis taken in Marshall depends upon the ease with which the
method can be applied and the effect its application will have on the
policies at stake in Federal Rule-state law conflicts. In regard to ease
of application, the court in Marshall itself conceded that the line
between strictly procedural state laws and those which have a
substantive effect, though drawn in procedural terms, will "not
always be easy to draw.""' The Second and Eighth Circuits looked
to the state courts' interpretations of the particular state laws in-
volved to aid them in their determinations of whether these state
laws were strictly procedural. 112 In contrast to the application of the
Marshall approach, the method of analysis adopted by the Fifth
Circuit, that Federal Rules prevail in all "arguably procedural mat-
ters,"" 3
 would be significantly easier to apply, since whenever a
Federal Rule covers the same subject matter as a state law, the state
law could conceivably always be reasonably characterized as argu-
ably procedural.
Therefore, resolving Federal Rule-state law conflicts by deter-
mining whether the state law has a direct substantive effect does not
appear to be the easiest, or even an easy, method of resolving these
1 °6 380 U.S. at 465.
107 E.g., Siegel, supra note 100. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
103
 E.g., Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1973). See
notes 85-96 supra and accompanying text.
"" 337 U.S. 530 (1949). See notes 62-68 supra and accompanying text.
II° 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See notes 69-77 supra and accompanying text.
508 F.1d at 44.
12 Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 1973); Sylvestri
v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 606 (2d Cir. 1968).
113 Welch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 446 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir. 1972).
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conflicts. It is submitted, however, that this method-- –cletermining
the effect of the state law—is no more difficult to apply than other
methods already used by federal courts to resolve other kinds of
issues. For example, federal courts in diversity actions must decide
whether they are bound to apply state law, rather than conflicting
federal common law, by making three separate determinations." 4
These determinations are whether application of the federal law will
lead to (1) forum shopping between the federal and state courts in
the state, (2) inequitable administration of the law within the state,
and (3) an outcome substantially different from the one which would
result if the state law had been applied. "s It would seem that
making these three determinations, which federal courts already
make, could not be easier than making the determination of whether
a state law has a direct substantive effect. For this reason it is
submitted that if the Supreme Court adopted the method used in
Marshall to resolve Federal Rule-state law conflicts, the application
of this method would not be impractical.
The effect that the application of the Marshall rule will have on
the policies involved in Federal Rule-state law conflicts should also
be considered in regard to whether the Supreme Court should adopt
the Marshall rule. The policies that have traditionally been consid-
ered in the resolution of federal law-state law conflicts in diversity
actions are uniformity and predictability of procedural law within
the federal court system," 6 uniformity and predictability of substan-
tive law within a state, 17
 and the policy reflected by the doctrine of
federalism. 118 It is submitted that application of the Marshall rule to
the resolution of Federal Rule-state law conflicts will adversely
effect the uniformity and predictability of procedural law within the
federal court system.
Whenever a state law with a direct substantive effect conflicts
with a Federal Rule, a federal court in a diversity action must apply
the state law, according to the Marshall rule. Consequently, Federal
Rules will not always be adhered to by federal courts. Furthermore,
to predict whether a Federal Rule will be controlling in a particular
case will be difficult, if the Marshall rule is applied, because the
conflicting state law will generally have to be analyzed before a
court can determine the effect of the state law. Therefore, if the only
goal in the resolution of Federal Rule-state law conflicts were to
achieve uniformity and predictability of procedural law within the
federal court system, a mechanical formula, that valid Federal
114 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
" 5 Id.
"6
 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963). The
reason that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hanna was because of "the threat to the
goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed" by the holding of the court of appeals, that
state law prevailed over the Federal Rule involved in the case. 380 U.S. at 463.
" Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
"I Id. at 78-80.
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Rules always prevail over conflicting state laws, would be a more
appropriate rule for the Supreme Court to adopt.
Application of the Marshall rule should, however, promote
uniformity and predictability of substantive law within a state. The
Marshall rule will ensure that even when a state law with a direct
substantive effect is cast in procedural terms, the state substantive law
will be adhered to by the federal court, since that state law must
prevail. Alternatively, if the formula, that valid Federal Rules prevail
in all arguably procedural matters, was used to resolve Federal Rule-
state law conflicts, an individual's substantive rights might vary de-
pending upon whether . a suit was tried in state or federal court. Since
application of the Marshall rule promotes uniformity of the substan-
tive law within a state, its application will prevent forum shopping or
inequitable administration of the law.
It is submitted that federalism will also be promoted if the
Marshall rule is adopted. Application of the rule will ensure that
state-created rights will not be encroached on by federal courts,
even when these state-created rights derive from a law which ap-
pears to be procedural. In contrast, if Federal Rules prevailed over
arguably procedural state laws, state-created rights would be en-
croached on whenever a Federal Rule, rather than a conflicting state
law with a direct substantive effect, was applied.
In the resolution of Federal-state law conflicts in which the
state law has a direct substantive effect, either the policy of
federalism or that of uniformity and predictability of procedural law
within the federal court system must give way. It is submitted that
federalism should prevail. While uniformity and predictability of
procedural law within the federal court• system is important and is a
constitutionally-permissible goal," 9 even the language of the Rules
Enabling Act makes it clear that this goal is not to be achieved at
the expense of federalism. 120 The Rules Enabling Act states that
while the • Supreme Court has the power to prescribe procedural
rules for federal courts, these rules must not "abridge, enlarge or
modify" state substantive law. 121 Moreover, in Erie, the Supreme
Court has already given priority to the doctrine of federalism over
the policy of uniformity and predictability of procedural law within
the federal court system. 122
Furthermore, Marshall is consistent with the rationale of the
Court in Erie, - which was _reaffirmed in Hanna: that federal courts
are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law in
diversity actions. 123 The Court in Erie also endeavored to prevent
forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law.' 24 Mar-
113 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-73.
120 28 U.S.C.	 2072 (1970).
121 Id.
122 304 U.S. at 75.
123 Id. at 78; accord, Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465, 471.
124 304 U.S. at 73-77.
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shall, like Erie, will have these same desirable effects. Finally, even
though Marshall appears to be inconsistent with some of the lan-
guage in Hanna, it would seem to be the proper interpretation in
light of Hanna's reaffirmation of the holding in Erie, that federal
courts must apply state substantive law.' 25 Thus, since application
of the Marshall rule is consistent with Erie and promotes
federalism, it is submitted that the Supreme Court should adopt the
Marshall rule for the resolution of Federal Rule-state law conflicts.
LUCY WEST BEHYMER
Constitutional Law—Public Utilities—State Action—Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co. 1 —Petitioner Catherine Jackson was a resi-
dential customer of respondent Metropolitan Edison Company
(Metropolitan), 2
 receiving electric service at her home in York,
Pennsylvania under an account in her name. Metropolitan term-
inated Jackson's account in September 1970 because of an asserted
delinquency in payments; 3 however, service to the residence was
restored under a new account in the name of a cooccupant, James
Dodson. Dodson left the residence in August 1971, and while
electrical power continued to be provided after his departure, no
subsequent payments were made for this service. 4 On October 6,
1971, two employees of Metropolitan visited the Jackson home in an
unsuccessful attempt to locate Dodson and collect the arrearages.
Another employee arrived on the following day, and upon investiga-
tion, informed Jackson that the meter had been tampered with so as
to prevent registration of the electricity consumed. 5 Disclaiming any
knowledge of this situation, Jackson attempted to have electrical
125 380 U.S. at 465, 471.
— U.S. —, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
2
 Metropolitan Edison is a "privately owned and operated" utility holding a certificate of
public convenience issued by the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n). Metropolitan is the sole distributor of electric power to a service area that includes
York, Pa. 95 S. Ct. at 451, 459.
3 The termination of service in September 1970 was not directly in issue in Jackson,
however, a reading of the lower court opinions in this case suggests that Metropolitan's record
of the outstanding balance was a factor in the subsequent termination of service in October
1971. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1973); Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 348 F, Supp. 954, 955-56 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
4 95 S. Ct. at 451.
5
 Id. at 452. Although Metropolitan's tariff provided the right to discontinue service for
"fraud or tampering" with the meter, the company did not choose to assert this ground as a
basis for the termination. Id. at 451 n.l. See note 7 infra. Furthermore, the certificate of
public convenience conferred upon Metropolitan certain rights of eminent domain, Pa. Stat.
Ann. fit., 66, § 1124 (Supp. 1974), as well as the right of entry to a customer's property for
maintenance and inspection of equipment. Pa. Pub. Util, Comm'n Elec. Reg., Rule 14D
[hereinafter cited as Rule 1401, cited in Jackson, 95 S. Ct. at 462 n.l. See notes 32, 33, 47
infra.
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